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I. The Intersection of Index Funds and ESG Investing
In recent years, two incompatible trends have risen to the forefront
of investing. The first is the dominance of index funds 1 in allowing
†
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1.

This Essay will use the term “index fund” to designate both actual index
funds and exchange traded funds (“ETFs”). Both of these investment
vehicles track an index with the main difference being that ETFs are traded
like stock on stock exchanges. See Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index
Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and
Policy, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 2029, 2044 (2019) (“The term ‘index fund’
encompasses both mutual funds and exchange traded funds (ETFs), or any
other investment vehicle that mechanically tracks an index.”); Jill Fisch,
Assaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The New Titans of Wall Street:
A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors, 168 U. Pa. L. Rev. 17,
19 n.4 (2019) (“An ETF is a fund which tracks an index but is publicly
traded on the market rather than purchased directly from (or sold to) the
fund sponsor.”); Giovanni Strampelli, Are Passive Index Funds Active
Owners? Corporate Governance Consequences of Passive Investing, 55 San
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passive investors to gain consistent returns and mitigate risks through
the diversified portfolios of these funds, which are designed to track the
components of financial markets. 2 The second is the environmental,
social, and governance (ESG) movement in which investors seek out
socially conscious companies and try to facilitate change in companies
to achieve ESG-related goals.3
Each of these movements is important, which helps to explain their
popularity. In regard to index funds, three entities—BlackRock,
Vanguard, and State Street—have become dominant players in
marketing and selling index funds. 4 As a consequence, the power of
Diego L. Rev. 803, 809 (2018) (“Passive index funds include index mutual
funds and exchange traded funds (ETFs). Although index mutual funds
and ETFs are technically different—index funds are traded only once a day
after markets have closed and ETFs can be bought and sold continuously
during the entire trading day—they share the fundamental characteristic of
seeking to replicate stock indices and to minimize cost ratios.”).
2.

See Quinn Curtis, Costs, Conflicts, and College Savings: Evaluating Section
529 Savings Plans, 37 Yale J. on Regul. 116, 140 (2020) (“Index funds,
investments that seek to track broad market factors at low cost, have grown
rapidly over the last decade. Investors who choose index funds forgo the
possibility of outperforming the market in exchange for the certainty of low
costs.”); Sean J. Griffith & Dorothy S. Lund, A Mission Statement for
Mutual Funds in Shareholder Litigation, 87 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1149, 1205
(2020) (“Index funds regularly rebalance their portfolios to bring their
holdings in line with the index they track, and buy and sell shares to manage
flows of capital into and out of the fund.”); Jay B. Kesten, Shareholder
Political Primacy, 10 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 161, 197 (2016) (“Index funds
invest in a portfolio of securities intended to track a particular market index,
such as the S&P 500 or Russell 3000.”).

3.

See Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty
and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a
Trustee, 72 Stan. L. Rev. 381, 388 (2020) (“ESG investing resists precise
definition, but roughly speaking, it is an umbrella term that refers to an
investment strategy that emphasizes a firm’s governance structure or the
environmental or social impacts of the firm’s products or practices. . . .
Other labels for the practice include ethical investing, economically targeted
investing, sustainable or responsible investing, and impact investing.”).

4.

See Nathan Atkinson, If Not the Index Funds, Then Who?, 17 Berkeley
Bus. L.J. 44, 45 (2020) (“In recent years, large asset managers have reached
incredible sizes, managing trillions of dollars of assets on behalf of tens of
millions of clients. The largest three, BlackRock, Vanguard, and State
Street, taken together (the ‘Big Three’), vote about 20% of shares in most
large companies, with the majority of these shares held in passive index
funds.”); Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 1, at 2033 (“Index funds—investment
funds that mechanically track the performance of an index—hold an
increasingly large proportion of the equity of U.S. public companies. The
sector is dominated by three index fund managers—BlackRock, Inc.
(BlackRock), State Street Global Advisors, a division of State Street
Corporation (SSGA), and the Vanguard Group (Vanguard), often referred
to as the ‘Big Three.’”); Brando Maria Cremona & Maria Lucia Passador,

1296

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 4·2021
Index Funds and ESG Hypocrisy

these entities is increasing rapidly and dramatically. In 2000, when
combined, these three entities were the largest shareholder in 25% of
S&P 500 companies, and by 2015, that number had jumped to 88%.5
At the time of the writing of this piece, these entities currently own 5%
to 7% of most public companies.6 These numbers are only likely to
increase. In regard to ESG, the ESG movement has taken root with
investors, especially millennials.7 Surveys suggests that 70% to 80% of
institutional investors take ESG information into account in making
investment decisions.8
The tendrils of the ESG movement have reached index funds as
well. BlackRock, State Street, and Vanguard have each promised to use
their voting power created by their management of these funds to push
forward an ESG agenda. 9 For example, in a 2020 letter to CEOs,
Shareholder Activism Today: Did Barbarians Storm the Gate?, 20 U.C.
Davis Bus. L.J. 207, 233 (2020) (“Index funds currently play an
increasingly important role in the asset management industry: indeed, index
funds managed by the so-called ‘Big Three’ (Blackrock, Vanguard and State
Street) have now become the largest investors within the modern capital
markets.”).
5.

See Brian R. Cheffins, Corporate Governance and Countervailing Power,
74 Bus. Law. 1, 42–43 (2019) (“The proportion of S&P 500 companies
where BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street combined would constitute
the largest shareholder increased from 25 percent in 2000 to 88 percent in
2015.”).

6.

See Edward B. Rock & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Common Ownership and
Coordinated Effects, 83 Antitrust L.J. 201, 224–25 (2020) (“BlackRock,
Vanguard, and State Street each currently own 5–7 percent of most public
companies . . . .”).

7.

See Dana Brakman Reiser & Anne Tucker, Buyer Beware: Variation and
Opacity in ESG and ESG Index Funds, 41 Cardozo L. Rev. 1921, 1978
(2020) (“Interest in sustainable and ESG investing appears concentrated in
women and millennials.”); Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, Corporate
Law and Social Risk, 73 Vand. L. Rev. 1401, 1451–52 (2020) (“[R]etail
investors, particularly millennials, are increasingly choosing to place their
money with companies committed to ESG. . . . According to estimates,
the total amount of assets invested in line with ESG principles had reached,
by 2018, about $22 trillion, or a quarter of all assets under management in
the world.”).

8.

See Virginia Harper Ho, Disclosure Overload? Lessons for Risk Disclosure
& ESG Reporting Reform from the Regulation S-K Concept Release, 65
Vill. L. Rev. 67, 82 n.80 (2020) (“[S]urveys find, on average, that 70% to
80% of institutional investors consider ESG information as important or
essential to investment analysis.”).

9.

See Alexander T. Kraik, Environmental, Social, and Governance Issues: An
Altered Shareholder Activist Paradigm, 44 Vt. L. Rev. 493, 526 (2020)
(“BlackRock, Vanguard, State Street, and other asset managers have
elevated ESG and use it as an important benchmark for their investment
decisions and governance priorities.”).
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Laurence D. Fink—Founder, Chairman, and Chief Executive Officer of
BlackRock—stated that ESG has been and will continue to be a priority
in BlackRock’s voting practices. He wrote:
Where we feel companies and boards are not producing effective
sustainability disclosures or implementing frameworks for mana–
ging these issues, we will hold board members accountable. Given
the groundwork we have already laid engaging on disclosure, and
the growing investment risks surrounding sustainability, we will
be increasingly disposed to vote against management and board
directors when companies are not making sufficient progress on
sustainability-related disclosures and the business practices and
plans underlying them. 10

In a 2020 letter to clients, he made clear that these practices would
be intensifying regarding index funds:
Investment stewardship is an essential component of our fiduciary
responsibility. This is particularly important for our index hold–
ings on behalf of clients, in which we are essentially permanent
shareholders. We have a responsibility to engage with companies
to understand if they are adequately disclosing and managing
sustainability-related risks, and to hold them to account through
proxy voting if they are not. We have been engaging with
companies for some time on these issues, as reflected in our
engagement priorities. As in other areas of our investment
functions, our investment stewardship team is intensifying its
focus and engagement with companies on sustainability-related
risks.11

State Street has unapologetically chartered a similar course
regarding ESG and index fund voting. State Street’s Stewardship
Report 2018-19 informs:
A significant challenge for asset managers with index strategies
invested in thousands of listed companies globally is to provide
active oversight of their holdings. As noted, our stewardship
program identifies a series of strategic priorities designed to
enhance the quality and define the scope of our stewardship
activities for the year. Identifying these priorities enables us to
10.

Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2020 Letter to CEOs: A Fundamental Reshaping
of Finance, BlackRock, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investorrelations/2020-larry-fink-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/S8FV-69AA] (last
visited May 21, 2021).

11.

Larry Fink, BlackRock’s 2020 Letter to Clients: Sustainability as
BlackRock’s New Standard for Investing, BlackRock, https://www.blac
krock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2020-blackrock-client-letter [https:
//perma.cc/9LKA-TG9H] (last visited May 21, 2021).
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plan and actively focus our engagement efforts on thematic ESG
and sector-specific issues that are important to our clients. We
develop our priorities based on several factors, including client
feedback received in the past year, emerging ESG trends,
developing macroeconomic conditions, and the regulatory envi–
ronment.12

Finally, Vanguard has also decided to pursue ESG-related
objectives through its index funds. A document from April 2019 by
Glenn Booraem, Vanguard Investment Stewardship Officer, details
Vaguard’s approach:
We consistently engage with portfolio companies about climate
risk, especially companies in carbon-intensive industries. We
believe that climate risk can potentially have a long-term impact
on companies in many sectors. But our discussions on these issues
are anchored to a broader conversation about governance, in
particular how a company’s strategy and the related risks are
governed by its board. Our index funds, by design, generally hold
all the companies in their benchmark; these include winners and
losers, leaders and laggards. This ownership across the spectrum
gives us the opportunity to influence investor outcomes by
directly engaging about material environmental and social risks
with directors and executives at the companies in which our funds
invest.13

Each of these statements from BlackRock, State Street, and
Vanguard can be boiled down into a contradictory phrase that sounds
like it belongs in George Orwell’s novel, 1984: “Diversity is
conformity.”14 To unpack this idea a bit more, BlackRock, State Street,
and Vanguard are selling index fund shares with the promise of
diversification of the portfolios that underlie those funds to stabilize
returns while mitigating risk, yet at the same time, they are fueling
conformity through their voting power related to those funds.
This Essay takes the position that the importation of ESG voting
into index funds by the dominate players in the index fund industry is
unacceptable because it creates an unresolvable conflict of interests, is
misleading to those purchasing shares in mutual funds, and is
12.

State Street Global Advisors, Stewardship Report 2018–19, at
25 (2019), https://www.ssga.com/library-content/products/esg/annual-ass
et-stewardship-report-2018-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3PH-R34X].

13.

Glenn Booraem, What We Do. How We Do It. Why It Matters., Vanguard
13 (Apr. 2019), https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/per
spectives-and-commentary/what_how_why.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5CV7894].

14.

See generally George Orwell, 1984 (1949) (“War is Peace;” “Freedom
is Slavery;” “Ignorance is Strength.”).
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undemocratic. This Essay argues that these issues could be resolved by
the SEC promulgating rules creating a fund name taxonomy to make
it clear to investors the nature of the funds in which they are investing.15
This Essay contributes to the existing literature in three main ways.
First, this Essay contains an extensive analysis of the problems of
pursuing ESG objectives through index funds, which include that it
creates an unresolvable conflict of interest, is misleading, and is
undemocratic.16 Second, this Essay proposes a fund name taxonomy for
investment funds to resolve the problems with pursuing ESG objectives
through index funds, which includes the requirement that the title
“index fund” be reserved only for passively managed funds that are
designed to track the components of financial markets. 17 Such an
approach would fit the underlying purposes of federal securities
regulation to mandate disclosure and allow investors to make informed
decisions regarding their investments. 18 Third, the analysis and
proposal in this Essay is especially important because at the time of
this Essay, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) is considering whether additional rulemaking is needed relating
to section 35(d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 19 which
mandates honesty in the naming of investment funds.20
The remainder of this Essay is structured as follows. Part II
explores the problems of pursuing ESG through index funds. Part III
examines various solutions to these problems. Finally, the last part
contains brief concluding remarks.

II. The Problems with Pursuing ESG
Through Index Funds
Superficially, the intersection of index funds and ESG seems like a
wonderful idea. For a large number of investors, the lure of relatively
predictable returns with minimal risk, while pursuing ESG goals, is
almost irresistible. Under the surface, however, the problems with
15.

See infra Part III (proposing the creation of a fund name taxonomy for
investment funds).

16.

See infra Part II (exploring the problems with pursuing ESG through index
funds).

17.

See infra Part III (discussing how a fund name taxonomy for investment
funds might be structured).

18.

See infra Part III.A (discussing the benefits of creating a fund name
taxonomy for investment funds).

19.

15 U.S.C. § 80a–34 (2018).

20.

See infra Part III.A (explaining that at the time of the writing of this Essay,
the SEC had recently issued a Request for Comments on Fund Names, 85
Fed. Reg. 13,221 (Mar. 6, 2020)).
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pursuing ESG through index funds are numerous, including that such
an approach creates an unresolvable conflict of interests, misleads
investors as to what fund managers are actually pursuing, and produces
undemocratic results. Each of these problems will be examined in turn.
A.

Unresolvable Conflict of Interest

Attempting to achieve ESG goals by using index funds as the
vehicle creates an unresolvable conflict of interests because of the
essential nature of these investment devices. Index funds are cons–
tructed, advertised, and sold based upon Modern Portfolio Theory.21 In
1952, Harry Markowitz introduced this theory in his article Portfolio
Selection in The Journal of Finance.22 In 1990, he won a Nobel Prize in
Economic Sciences based upon his work on this topic. 23 Modern
Portfolio Theory posits that through diversification, investors can
create the greatest likelihood of consistent returns while minimizing
21.

See Alyssa A. DiRusso & Kathleen M. Sablone, Statutory Techniques for
Balancing the Financial Interests of Trust Beneficiaries, 39 U. S.F. L.
Rev. 261, 268 (2005) (footnotes omitted) (“The . . . concept behind
modern portfolio theory is that capital markets are basically efficient.
Importantly, this assertion leads to the conclusion that an individual
investor selecting a portfolio should not be able to achieve a greater return
than the market in general. . . . [M]odern portfolio theory not only permits
passive investments (such as index funds), but it actually questions the use
of more costly active management, which may be unable to achieve greater
returns.”); Charles R. Korsmo, Delaware’s Retreat from Judicial Scrutiny
of Mergers, 10 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 55, 99 (2019) (“[I]ndex funds are
certainly ‘sophisticated’ investors in the sense that they understand the
central lesson of modern portfolio theory—that picking stocks is usually a
fool’s errand . . . .”); Jerry W. Markham, Privatizing Social Security, 38
San Diego L. Rev. 747, 798 (2001) (“Modern portfolio theory encourages
passive investment in which a portfolio is diversified to track some stock
market index that broadly reflects over-all market movements.”).

22.

See generally Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. Fin. 77 (1952)
(introducing Modern Portfolio Theory).

23.

See Susan N. Gary, Best Interests in the Long Term: Fiduciary Duties and
ESG Integration, 90 U. Colo. L. Rev. 731, 748 (2019) (“Harry Markowitz,
an economist who won the 1990 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences,
published his explanation of [Modern Portfolio Theory] in 1952, and it
influenced investing strategies and changes to the prudent investor standard
in the years that followed.”); Philip J. Ruce, The Trustee and the Prudent
Investor: The Emerging Acceptance of Alternative Investments as the New
Fiduciary Standard, 53 S. Tex. L. Rev. 653, 667 (2012) (“[Modern
Portfolio Theory] found its beginnings in the 1952 article Portfolio Selection
by Harry Markowitz, the insights of which won Markowitz the Nobel Prize
in Economics.”); Stewart E. Sterk, Rethinking Trust Law Reform: How
Prudent Is Modern Prudent Investor Doctrine?, 95 Cornell L. Rev. 851,
858 (2010) (“Modern portfolio theory owes its genesis to a 1952 article by
Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection—an article whose insights ultimately
won Markowitz the Nobel Prize in Economics.”).
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risk.24 A complete laying out of this theory is beyond the word limits of
this Essay. With that said, Modern Portfolio Theory can be boiled down
to a single word—diversification.25 When index funds are advertised
and sold to investors, fund managers are selling individuals the ability
to diversify their portfolios through a single investment device.26 The

24.

See Michael Cappucci, The Proxy War Against Proxy Advisors, 16 N.Y.U.
J.L. & Bus. 579, 583 (2020) (“Modern portfolio theory . . . provided
mathematical support for the idea that holding a well-diversified portfolio
of many assets is less risky than, and therefore preferable to, holding a port–
folio of fewer stocks.”); Paul N. Cox, Reflections on Ex Ante Compensation
and Diversification of Risk as Fairness Justifications for Limiting Fiduciary
Obligations of Corporate Officers, Directors, and Controlling Shareholders,
60 Temp. L.Q. 47, 53 (1987) (“Modern portfolio theory and capital asset
pricing theory suggest that investment in an efficiently diversified portfolio,
such as an index fund, will virtually eliminate unsystematic risk.”); Charles
Korsmo & Minor Myers, The Flawed Corporate Finance of Dell and DFC
Global, 68 Emory L.J. 221, 226 (2018) (“A basic tenet of modern portfolio
theory is that, for diversified investors, only market or systematic risks
affect asset values, while firm-specific risks are largely irrelevant to
pricing.”).

25.

See Tom C.W. Lin, The New Market Manipulation, 66 Emory L.J. 1253,
1312–13 (2017) (“Modern portfolio theory suggests that market-wide
diversification along with low transaction fees would permit investors to
reduce their risk exposure and maximize the benefits of compounding
returns over the long term.”); Stewart E. Sterk, Trust Decanting: A Critical
Perspective, 38 Cardozo L. Rev. 1993, 1999 (2017) (“The central insight
of modern portfolio theory [is] that a prudent investor should not avoid risk
altogether, but should instead minimize risk through diversifi–
cation . . . .”); Eva E. Subotnik, Artistic Control After Death, 92 Wash.
L. Rev. 253, 299 (2017) (“[M]odern portfolio theory basically instructs that
a prudent investor should diversify investments.”).

26.

See José Azar, The Common Ownership Trilemma, 87 U. Chi. L. Rev.
263, 265 (2020) (“The enormous success of index funds and other
instruments to achieve better and cheaper diversification is the practical
counterpart to the triumph of the ideas of Modern Portfolio Theory, which
showed that rational shareholders would want (under some assumptions, of
course) to hold the market portfolio.”); Charles R. Korsmo, The Audience
for Corporate Disclosure, 102 Iowa L. Rev. 1581, 1604 (2017) (“Part of
the reason for this explosion of diversified index and mutual funds is that
the central lesson of Modern Portfolio Theory—which has come to dominate
the academic understanding of securities markets over the past half
century—is that holding a well-diversified portfolio will be optimal for most
ordinary investors, offering them the best possible combination of low risk
and high return.”); Gabriel Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Index Theory:
The Law, Promise and Failure of Financial Indices, 30 Yale J. on Reg.
1, 7–8 (2013) (“[I]ndex-guided investment lets retail investors take
advantage of two of the most important financial insights of the late
twentieth century: the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, which posits that
market prices reflect all available financial information, and Modern
Portfolio Theory, which posits that diversified portfolios can achieve similar
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financial market that the index fund tracks will have certain criteria to
be a part of it.27 For example, an index fund that tracks the S&P 500
would have only large companies in its portfolio,28 but the goal remains
diversification.29 Importantly, diversification is a means, not an end.
The end of Modern Portfolio Theory is profit.30
returns at less risk than undiversified portfolios—or superior returns with
equal risk.”).
27.

See Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three, 99
B.U. L. Rev. 721, 727 (2019) (“Among those equity investment funds,
index funds invest in portfolios that attempt to track the performance of a
particular benchmark stock market index, such as the S&P 500 or the
Russell 3000.”); Cremona & Passador, supra note 4, at 233 (“[T]he main
peculiarity of index funds is their goal not to beat the market, but rather
to match or track the performance of various indexes.”); Alan R. Palmiter
& Ahmed E. Taha, Mutual Fund Performance Advertising: Inherently and
Materially Misleading?, 46 Ga. L. Rev. 289, 297 (2012) (“Passively
managed funds typically are index funds, managed to track the returns of
a specified market index, such as the S&P 500 Index.”).

28.

See Richard A. Booth, Index Funds and Securities Fraud Litigation, 64
S.C. L. Rev. 265, 285 n.109 (2012) (“The S&P 500 measures the perfor–
mance of a particular segment of the market, namely, large capitalization
stocks.”); Alexander I. Platt, Index Fund Enforcement, 53 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 1453, 1464 (2020) (“[T]he S&P 500 is a well-known index maintained
by Standard & Poor’s and is comprised of 500 large U.S. companies.”);
Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 26, at 18–19 (“[T]he S&P 500 is an
indicator and bellwether of blue-chip America, meant to track the most
significant large-capitalization firms in the leading U.S. industries.”).

29.

See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Index Funds and Corporate
Governance: Let Shareholders be Shareholders, 100 B.U. L. Rev. 1771,
1774 (2020) (“Long the darling of finance scholars, index funds offer
investors the benefit of a diversified portfolio at low cost. Because index
funds—which do not need to employ analysts—charge lower fees than
actively managed funds and because the conventional wisdom that it is
difficult to outperform the market has proven correct, index funds often
have better returns than active funds.”); Kesten, supra note 2, at 191 (“[F]or
most retail investors, the safest course of action is not to try to pick the
right thirty stocks, but rather to invest in low-cost, more thoroughly
diversified products, such as index funds that track broader markets.”);
Emily Winston, Managerial Fixation and the Limitations of Shareholder
Oversight, 71 Hastings L.J. 699, 722 (2020) (“[M]any institutional
investors, such as mutual funds and index funds, exist specifically to provide
diversification and therefore are invested in a very large number of
companies.”).

30.

See Madison Condon, Externalities and the Common Owner, 95 Wash. L.
Rev. 1, 13 n.53 (2020) (“Modern portfolio theory holds that investors can
maximize their return, given a desired amount of risk, by diversifying their
portfolios.”); Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits
in Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 21 (2008) (“In its simplest
form, modern portfolio theory cautions investors to maintain a diversified
mix of stocks, bonds, and cash in order to balance the volatility of their
portfolios with the desire to maximize returns.”); David J. Herzig, The
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In regard to ESG investing, the goal is dramatically different. The
ESG movement is a form of principle-based investing, which employs
various ESG factors in investment practices. 31 As a result, ESG
investors seek to invest in companies with management who already
align with their views on ESG-related issues.32 In addition, they seek to
move the management of companies into alignment with their views
regarding ESG-related matters.33 Although variations in opinions and

Income Equality Case for Eliminating the Estate Tax, 90 S. Cal. L. Rev.
1143, 1176–77 (2017) (“Modern Portfolio Theory is a theory of finance,
developed by Harry Markowitz in the 1950s, that attempts to maximize a
portfolio return.”).
31.

See Tom C.W. Lin, Incorporating Social Activism, 98 B.U. L. Rev. 1535,
1580–81 (2018) (“[O]ne of the growing areas in investment management in
recent years has been impact or social investing. Impact or social investing
refers to investments that seek positive financial returns while aiming to
make a positive social impact, particularly on environmental, social, and
governance (‘ESG’) factors.”); Omari Scott Simmons, Chancery’s Greatest
Decision: Historical Insights on Civil Rights and the Future of Shareholder
Activism, 76 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1259, 1289 (2019) (“In socially
responsible or impact investing, environmental, social, and governance
(ESG) factors guide decisionmaking.”).

32.

See Beth Haddock, Tucker Pribor & Kate Starr, Why Corporate Attorneys
and Other Gatekeepers Should Consider ESG and Sustainability Principles,
30 Fordham Env’t L. Rev. 1, 4 (2018) (“ESG investments entail
specialized investment strategies and typically require additional
investment instructions that may relate to higher standards for corporate
accountability for investable assets with regard to, for example, use of
resources, labor practices, supply chain management, conflicts of interest,
internal controls, and board diversity.”); Joseph Manning, Myopic Madness:
Breaking the Stranglehold of Shareholder Short-Termism to Address
Climate Change and Build a Sustainable Economy, 10 Ariz. J. Env’t L.
& Pol’y 425, 426–27 (2020) (“Today, an increasing number of investors
screen investments for environmental, social, and governance . . . factors,
while both mainstream and boutique investment firms offer sustainable
investment product lines to consumers.”).

33.

See Lisa Benjamin, Institutional Investors in the UK and “Carbon-Major”
Companies: Private Environmental Governance Post-Paris, 9 Geo. Wash.
J. Energy & Env’t L. 5, 11 (2018) (“Institutional investors can adopt a
variety of sustainable investment strategies that include active approaches,
such as including ESG factors in the investment process, shareholder
activism through the use of shareholder resolutions, and engagement with
management.”); David Hess, Combating Corruption Through Corporate
Transparency: Using Enforcement Discretion to Improve Disclosure, 21
Minn. J. Int’l. L. 42, 71 (2012) (“In addition to using ESG factors in
investment decision making, . . . shareholders often engage directly with
corporations to push for improvements.”); Reiser & Tucker, supra note 7,
at 1932 (“In addition to using various strategies to incorporate ESG factors
into investment selection, ESG funds also practice engagement. They utilize
their power as shareholders—to vote for directors, on fundamental
transactions and shareholder proposals, make shareholder proposals, and
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goals do exist among those interested and engaging in ESG investing,
the ESG movement is in general an effort to create a uniform
commitment within companies to ESG-related issues.34 In some instan–
ces, investors who are committed to ESG investing are even willing to
forgo profit based upon their commitments to various ESG-related
principles.35
In regard to the intersection of ESG and index funds, the conflict
of interest is almost beyond peradventure. In the vast majority of cases,
index funds are advertised, marketed, and sold based upon the notion
that they provide an opportunity for creating portfolio diversification
through a single financial product.36 When a fund manager markets and
pushes forward ESG objectives in regard to an index fund, they are
working to create standardization and uniformity within the index
fund’s portfolio.37 Diversity and uniformity are antonyms. To claim that
more informal efforts to influence management—to drive ESG changes in
investee companies.”).
34.

See supra note 3 and accompanying text (describing the ESG movement).

35.

See Gadinis & Miazad, supra note 7, at 1409–10 (“[T]here are many ESG
initiatives that do not readily fit within the confines of profit maximization,
such as large-scale workplace efforts to eliminate the gender pay gap.”);
Bernard S. Sharfman, The Risks and Rewards of Shareholder Voting, 73
SMU L. Rev. 849, 872 (2020) (“[A]n institutional investor with a strong
preference for . . . some component of environmental, social, and corporate
governance may prioritize that preference over the default objective of
shareholder wealth maximization.”); Marcia Narine Weldon & Rachel
Epstein, Beyond Bitcoin: Leveraging Blockchain to Benefit Business and
Society, 20 Transactions: Tenn. J. Bus. L. 837, 888 (2019) (“Although
shareholders, particularly institutional shareholders, clearly value wealth
maximization, more are also pressing companies to provide data on
environmental, social, and governance factors (ESG).”).

36.

See supra note 26 and accompanying text (explaining that index funds are
advertised and sold based on their claimed ability to provide for portfolio
diversification).

37.

See Booraem, supra note 13, at 13 (“Our fund shareholders have entrusted
their assets to Vanguard to create and protect sustainable, long-term value
as they save for their important financial goals. Ensuring that the 13,000
global companies in which our funds invest on their behalf have a similar
long-term mindset is central to our stewardship program.”); Fink, supra
note 10 (“[BlackRock] believe[s] that when a company is not effectively
addressing a material issue, its directors should be held accountable. . . .
Where we feel companies and boards are not producing effective sustain–
ability disclosures or implementing frameworks for managing these issues,
we will hold board members accountable. Given the groundwork we have
already laid engaging on disclosure, and the growing investment risks
surrounding sustainability, we will be increasingly disposed to vote against
management and board directors when companies are not making sufficient
progress on sustainability-related disclosures and the business practices and
plans underlying them.”); Cyrus Taraporevala, CEO’s Letter on our 2020
Proxy Voting Agenda, State Street Global Advisors (Jan. 28, 2020),
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one is seeking both is contradictory and impossible. Individuals and
entities owing fiduciary duties relating to index funds are arguably
placed in a position where they are in breach of fiduciary duties
regardless of whether they pursue retaining diversification or ESG
standardization because they have promised both.
To overcome this concern, the common move is to claim that the
interest in ESG is limited to improving the profitability of the index
funds. For example, on July 24, 2018, Cyrus Taraporevala, president
and chief executive officer of State Street Global Advisors, published a
letter in The Financial Times and stated the following:
Efforts by large index fund managers to engage with public
companies have recently come under attack from some business
leaders. They complain that we are misusing our rights as share–
holders to enforce arbitrary political or social “values” because we
raise environmental, social and governance concerns with the
boards of the companies in which we invest.
This completely misrepresents the mission of State Street Global
Advisors and other large index fund managers. We seek long-term
value for millions of ordinary investors in a world that has become
increasingly obsessed with short-term results. That goal, not some
political agenda, is why we have developed a rigorous, researchbased shareholder engagement programme. We raise all kinds of
issues with boards that might materially impact their company’s
ability to generate sustainable returns over the long haul. 38

The problem is that this only deepens the conflict of interests.
Rather than just a dilemma being created between obtaining passive
diversification and pursing ESG objectives, a trilemma is created among
obtaining passive diversification, pursuing ESG objectives, and actively
seeking profitability. In fact, trilemma is probably not even the correct
description because ESG is an amorphous term that potentially entails
a wide-range range of objectives.39
https://www.ssga.com/us/en/institutional/ic/insights/informing-betterdecisions-with-esg [https://perma.cc/4DEW-KKZG] (“As one of the
world’s largest investment managers, each year State Street Global
Advisors engages in dialogue with companies about a variety of issues
critical to long-term performance—from business strategy to independent
board leadership to sustainability. . . . [W]e will continue our active
engagement with boards on sustainability, but also use our proxy vote to
press companies that are falling behind and failing to engage.”).
38.

Cyrus Taraporevala, Index Funds Must Be Activists to Serve Investors, Fin.
Times (July 24, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/4e4c119a-8c25-11e8affd-da9960227309 [https://perma.cc/DRW2-QQUW].

39.

See Gadinis & Miazad, supra note 7, at 1414 (“Despite trillions of dollars
poured into ESG investments, a decade of corporate soul searching, and a
bevy of standard setters, one would be hard-pressed to come up with a
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B.

Materially Misleading

Advertising and selling index funds that are claimed to be managed
to obtain passive diversification, pursue ESG objectives, and actively
seek profitability teeters dangerously close to a material misrepre–
sentation regarding these investment vehicles. The conflicts of interests
discussed in the previous Part demonstrate that all three of these goals
cannot be pursued and achieved at the same time.
To begin, importantly and unequivocally, this Essay does not assert
that any person or entity has engaged in unlawful activity for at least
two reasons. First, most, if not all, of the potential violations of the law
that could be brought have a variety of elements. Even if a material
misrepresentation exists, which it may not, these other elements must
be satisfied. For example, section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 40 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereupon 41 are catch-all
provisions under the federal securities law,42 and these provisions apply
to the purchase and sale of index funds.43 A private right of action under
these provisions has numerous elements, including requirements of
economic loss and loss causation.44 Some have claimed that pursuit of
consistent definition for this phenomenon.”); Reiser & Tucker, supra note
7, at 1940 (“Unfortunately, even the most motivated of investors will
struggle to unpack what ESG means for a particular fund in a meaningful
way.”); Bernard S. Sharfman, Now Is the Time to Designate Proxy Advisors
as Fiduciaries under ERISA, 25 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 1, 16 (2020)
(“ESG has its roots in the practice of avoiding investment in firms that
make antisocial products. This practice can be traced back to the 18th
century. However, this simple ethical approach to investing has morphed
into what is now known as ESG, a concept that is so undefined as to be
virtually all encompassing.”).
40.

See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2018).

41.

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2020).

42.

Based upon the legislative history, the Supreme Court of the United States
has regularly held that section 10(b) is designed to be a catch-all provision
for addressing securities fraud. See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston,
459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983) (“Section 10(b) is a ‘catchall’ antifraud provision
. . . .”); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980) (“Section 10(b)
was designed as a catch-all clause to prevent fraudulent practices.”); Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976) (“This brief explanation
of § 10(b) by a spokesman for its drafters is significant. The section was
described rightly as a ‘catchall’ clause to enable the Commission ‘to deal
with new manipulative (or cunning) devices.’” (quoting Hearings on H.R.
7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com.,
73d Cong., 115 (1934))).

43.

See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2018) (providing the definition of a security
under the Securities Act of 1933); id. § 78c(a)(10) (providing the definition
of a security under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934).

44.

See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific–Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148,
157 (2008) (“In a typical § 10(b) private action a plaintiff must prove (1) a
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ESG objectives through index funds and other mutual funds actually
improve their profitability. 45 Assuming this is true, an action under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 would not prevail because the elements of
economic loss and loss causation elements would not be satisfied.
Second, for purposes of federal securities law, what is a misrepre–
sentation, especially when it is contrasted with mere puffery, is an
amorphous and ambiguous concept,46 and the definitional difficulties
exist regarding what is material as well.47 As a consequence, this Essay
material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a
connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or
sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission;
(5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.”).
45.

See Susan N. Gary, Values and Value: University Endowments, Fiduciary
Duties, and ESG Investing, 42 J. Coll. & U.L. 247, 250 (2016) (“In recent
years, some investors have begun to focus on the significance of ESG factors
in improving returns while reducing risk.”); Claire A. Hill, Marshalling
Reputation to Minimize Problematic Business Conduct, 99 B.U. L. Rev.
1193, 1205 (2019) (“[P]art of the rhetoric in mainstream pushes for ESG
is . . . that sustainability yields long-term profits.”); Michael J. Vargas, In
Defense of E. Merrick Dodd: Corporate Social Responsibility in Modern
Corporate Law and Investment Strategy, 73 Bus. Law. 337, 363 (2018)
(“[I]nvestors have recognized the gains that can be realized from socially
conscious investing, leading to an increase in the number and value of
investment funds applying environmental, social, and governance (‘ESG’)
metrics.”).

46.

See Andrew Horwitz, Taking the Cop out of Copping a Plea: Eradicating
Police Prosecution of Criminal Cases, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 1305, 1324 (1998)
(“The fine line between misrepresentation and ‘puffery’ is often quite
difficult even for an attorney to identify.”); Peter Reilly, Was Machiavelli
Right? Lying in Negotiation and the Art of Defensive Self-Help, 24 Ohio
St. J. on Disp. Resol. 481, 514–15 (2009) (“It can be difficult to draw a
distinction between permissible puffing and impermissible factual misrep–
resentation constituting fraud.”); Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense
Lawyer as Effective Negotiator: A Systemic Approach, 2 Clinical L. Rev.
73, 123–24 (1995) (“The line between a lie or deliberate misrepresentation
and bluffing, posturing, puffing or gamesmanship . . . is not always
clear.”).

47.

See George S. Georgiev, Too Big to Disclose: Firm Size and Materiality
Blindspots in Securities Regulation, 64 UCLA L. Rev. 602, 620 (2017) (“At
their core, many of the materiality determinations that firms are called upon
to make involve the application of vague regulatory and judicial guidance
as part of an intensely fact-specific inquiry that often involves predictions
about effects in future time periods.”); Amanda M. Rose, The “Reasonable
Investor” of Federal Securities Law: Insights from Tort Law’s “Reasonable
Person” & Suggested Reforms, 43 J. Corp. L. 77, 78–79 (2017)
(“Materiality’s vagueness stems from its definition: material information is
information that a ‘reasonable investor’ would consider important. The
‘reasonable investor’ is at best a shadowy figure, described only generically
in judicial opinions and—in doctrine if not in practice—someone for the
fact-finder to identify case-by-case.”); Vijay Sekhon, Enforcement of
Material Non-Disclosure Under the Federal Securities Laws, 16 Stan. J.L.
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merely asserts that advertising and selling index funds that are claimed
to be managed to obtain passive diversification, pursue ESG objectives,
and actively seek profitability teeters dangerously close to a material
misrepresentation. It does not conclude that material misrepresen–
tations are actually occurring.
Yet asserting that index funds can be managed to obtain passive
diversification, pursue ESG objectives, and actively seek profitability
likely entails some sort of misrepresentation. The line between a
misrepresentation and mere puffery for purposes of federal securities
law is a blurry one.48 The logical dissonance regarding claiming that
index funds can be managed to obtain passive diversification, pursue
ESG objectives, and actively seek profitability, however, is manifest
because not all three aims can be pursued simultaneously. This is true
because index funds cannot deliver diversity and uniformity at the same
time. The issue of active management of funds touted and purchased
for their passivity is problematic as well. 49 Perhaps, index fund
marketers, sellers, and managers have been noisy enough about their
obviously conflicting goals to overcome concerns about misrepre–
sentations, but this likely turns on the question of the materiality of
the assertions being made by those advertising, selling, and managing
index funds.
The representations by those advertising, marketing, and managing
index funds may constitute material misrepresentations under federal
securities law. In TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., the Supreme
Bus. & Fin. 273, 277 (2011) (“The concept of materiality under the federal
securities laws has been criticized by scholars and practitioners as being
vague. They claim that the concept does not allow public companies to
identify with reasonable certainty the boundaries between lawful and
unlawful conduct . . . .”).
48.

See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties in
distinguishing between misrepresentations and mere puffery).

49.

See Cappucci, supra note 24, at 583–84 (“[M]any investors have sought to
avoid the hassle and expense of holding thousands of different stocks by
investing through passive index funds. Managing a passive portfolio
designed to match the performance of an index takes considerably less
creativity and talent—two highly compensated skills—than managing an
active portfolio.”); Fisch et al., supra note 1, at 19 (“Drawn by the lower
costs of these products as well as a literature reporting that even savvy
money managers cannot consistently beat the market, an increasing number
of retail investors invest through indexed mutual funds and exchange-traded
funds (ETFs) (collectively, index funds or passive funds)—funds that do not
make information-based trading decisions.”); Robert C. Illig, What Hedge
Funds Can Teach Corporate America: A Roadmap for Achieving Insti–
tutional Investor Oversight, 57 Am. U. L. Rev. 225, 331–32 (2007) (“Rather
than seek to achieve profit growth through stock picking acumen, [investors
in index funds] embrace the lessons of the efficient capital markets
hypothesis and reject any efforts to actively follow their investments.”).

1309

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 4·2021
Index Funds and ESG Hypocrisy

Court established the standard for materiality under the federal
securities law.50 Writing for a unanimous Court in a matter brought
under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule
14a-9 promulgated thereupon, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote, “[a]n
omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to
vote.”51 He continued, “[p]ut another way, there must be a substantial
likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the
‘total mix’ of information made available.”52 In Basic Inc. v. Levinson,
the Supreme Court adopted this same standard of materiality for
actions under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 involving reasonable
investors and the purchase or sale of securities.53
If a misrepresentation is occurring by those individuals and entities
asserting that index funds can be managed to obtain passive
diversification, pursue ESG objectives, and actively seek profitability,
such a misrepresentation could also potentially be material. A lot turns
on who is a reasonable investor for purposes of the application of federal
securities law to index funds. The question of who constitutes a
reasonable investor for purposes of federal securities law has been the
subject of fierce debate. 54 While a “one size fits all” approach that
provides a single definition for all circumstances might be possible,55
50.

426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).

51.

Id.

52.

Id.

53.

485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988).

54.

See Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. Rev. 678, 694–95
(2013) (“The reasonable investor, thus far, has remained anonymous,
elusive, and the subject of much inquiry. Legal scholars and commentators
have speculated on the reasonable investor’s gender, temperament, and
sophistication, among other characteristics.”); Rose, supra note 47, at 118
(“For decades the reasonable investor test has been a flashpoint for debate
in securities law circles.”).

55.

See Tom C.W. Lin, Reasonable Investor(s), 95 B.U. L. Rev. 461, 462
(2015) (“Investors exist everywhere, in every form. . . . Yet for all their
diversity, financial regulation frequently treats them monolithically as ‘the
reasonable investor.’”); Geoffrey Rapp, Rewiring the DNA of Securities
Fraud Litigation: Amgen’s Missed Opportunity, 44 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 1475,
1481 (2013) (“The SEC’s vision of the reasonable investor centers on the
typical ‘retail’ investor. The reasonable investor is neither a sophisticated
money manager nor an electronically savvy day trader. Rather, the
reasonable investor is an ordinary person who invests money in securities
subject to the SEC’s regulatory authority.”); Aisha I. Saad & Diane Strauss,
The New “Reasonable Investor” and Changing Frontiers of Materiality:
Increasing Investor Reliance on ESG Disclosures and Implications for
Securities Litigation, 17 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 391, 393–94 (2020) (“The
reasonable investor archetype, which arose from early 20th century case
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questions of materiality are highly factually dependent, which makes it
far more likely that the decision of who is a reasonable investor may
vary based on the facts of the particular situation, especially in regard
to the type of investment product that is being sold and to whom it is
being marketed. 56 Index funds are suitable for and marketed to
individuals with limited investment knowledge who are interested in
passive investments with relatively reliable returns and relatively
limited risk, i.e., unsophisticated investors are often reasonable
investors in index funds. 57 Thus, while a knowledgeable and alert
investor might quickly recognize the impossibility of those advertising,
selling, and managing index funds relentlessly seeking to obtain passive
diversification, pursue ESG objectives, and actively seek profitability at
the same time, many reasonable investors in index funds likely would
not. The existing “total mix” of information available might be
sufficient to put reasonable investors in index funds on notice of
potential concerns, but it is a close call. Certainly, BlackRock, State
Street, and Vanguard have been very open about their pursuit of ESG
objectives through the diversified portfolios of index funds to obtain
greater profits for their shareholders. 58 Nonetheless, based on the
law, conceives of the investor as an economically rational actor who relies
solely on financial disclosures in making decisions about the purchase and
sale of securities.”).
56.

See Arthur B. Laby, Differentiating Gatekeepers, 1 Brook. J. Corp. Fin.
& Com. L. 119, 150 (2006) (“The [materiality] standard is ambiguous. It
depends on what a reasonable investor would decide, which is often
dependent on how a particular judge or regulator views the facts.”); Yvonne
Ching Ling Lee, The Elusive Concept of “Materiality” Under U.S. Federal
Securities Laws, 40 Willamette L. Rev. 661, 664 (2004) (“[T]he concept
of materiality pivots upon what the reasonable investor would decide;
though a useful and flexible legal device, it is often a ‘wild card,’ determined
by the regulators and/or judges based on the specific facts in light of
policy.”); Laura Palk, Ignorance Is Bliss: Should Lack of Personal Benefit
Knowledge Immunize Insider Trading?, 13 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 101, 144
n.280 (2016) (“Materiality is a fact-specific analysis and depends on the
weight a reasonable investor attributes to the information.”).

57.

See Stephen J. Choi, Promoting Issuer Choice in Securities Regulation, 41
Va. J. Int’l L. 815, 838 (2001) (“Through an index fund, unsophisticated
investors . . . achieve equity-based returns and diversification of unsys–
tematic risks while avoiding the need to investigate any one particular
company.”); Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A MarketBased Proposal, 88 Calif. L. Rev. 279, 301 (2000) (“Due to the passive
nature of index funds, informational asymmetries that may disadvantage
unsophisticated investors in the securities markets are at a minimum. . . .
To the extent unsophisticated investors desire to diversify their overall
investments to include securities, the availability of index funds meets this
preference.”).

58.

See BlackRock, BlackRock ESG Integration Statement 2 (rev.
2020), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blkesg-investment-statement-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8ED-JR6D] (“As
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inherent conflict of interest, concerns linger as to how confusing this
might be to reasonable investors within these index funds.
C.

Undemocratic

The ESG movement entails numerous important issues that are
increasingly of interest to investors and society at large. 59 In many
instances, however, federal and state governments have failed to act
sufficiently to address these issues.60 As a consequence, one reason to
praise BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street for addressing ESG
issues in the management of index funds is that these three entities can
act as de facto regulators in instances in which federal and state
governments have failed or refused to act.61 Such behavior is proble–
long-term investors, accounting for environmental, social, and governance
(ESG) risks and opportunities helps us provide sustainable value to our
clients.”); State St. Glob. Advisors, Aim Higher: Helping Investors
Move from Ambition to Action with ESG Investment Approaches
4 (2018), https://www.statestreet.com/content/dam/statestreet/documen
ts/Articles/aim-higher-helping-investors-move-from-ambition-to-action-wit
h-ESG-investment-approaches.pdf [https://perma.cc/KR2M-52JQ] (“In
the pursuit of better investment outcomes, we have an opportunity to add
value by helping clients aim for improved performance and better ESG
outcomes.”); ESG Investing: Discover Funds that Reflect What Matters
Most to You, Vanguard, https://investor.vanguard.com/investing/esg/
[https://perma.cc/FZ55-2RVK] (last visited April 1, 2021) (“Over the long
term, we believe our ESG products are enduring investment options for
anyone interested in aligning their values with their fund selections.”).
59.

See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of
the ESG movement).

60.

See Tamara C. Belinfanti, Shareholder Cultivation and New Governance,
38 Del. J. Corp. L. 789, 857 (2014) (“The SEC has slowly been accreting
sustainability and other ESG issues into its reporting framework since the
1970s, but it has not done so in a systematic way.”); Brent J. Horton, Rising
to Their Full Potential: How a Uniform Disclosure Regime Will Empower
Benefit Corporations, 9 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 101, 132 (2019) (“[T]he SEC
has traditionally been reluctant to require social disclosure (sometimes
referred to as environmental, social, and governance concerns, or ‘ESG’).”);
Ruth Jebe, The Convergence of Financial and ESG Materiality: Taking
Sustainability Mainstream, 56 Am. Bus. L.J. 645, 650 (2019) (“While the
SEC has demonstrated little interest in the disclosure of ESG information,
the investing community increasingly wants this information.”).

61.

See Caleb N. Griffin, Environmental & Social Voting at Index Funds, 44
Del. J. Corp. L. 167, 209 (2020) (“[BlackRock, State Street, and
Vanguard] have the power to determine the fate of a substantial proportion
of shareholder proposals on E&S. Even where their vote alone is not
sufficient to determine the outcome, their vote can still impact whether a
company will act in response to a particular proposal and whether that
proposal can be resubmitted in the near future. Ultimately, the Big Three
have become the arbiters of some of the most controversial E&S ballot
items.”).
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matic, however, because allowing these entities to play such a role is
undemocratic in a variety of different ways, including that these entities
are unelected, are focused solely on the financial interests of investors,
are subject to inadequate check and balances, and have limited to no
regulatory experience.
First, allowing investment fund managers to function as de facto
regulators is undemocratic because these fund managers are not elected.
Although investment in index funds is common, which is the reason for
the current power wielded by BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street,
it is far from universal.62 Democracy is rule by the people, often through
elected representatives, i.e., representative democracy. 63 No vote has
ever been conducted to give BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street
the power to regulate ESG matters. At best, allowing them to regulate
is plutocracy, or government by the wealthy, which is an affront to
democratic principles.64
62.

See Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 27, at 723 (“Based [on] our analysis of
recent trends, we conclude that the Big Three will likely continue to grow
into a ‘Giant Three,’ and that the Giant Three will likely come to dominate
voting in public companies.”); Caleb N. Griffin, Margins: Estimating the
Influence of the Big Three on Shareholder Proposals, 73 SMU L. Rev. 409,
410 (2020) (“Just three index fund providers—Vanguard, BlackRock, and
State Street (collectively, the Big Three)—control the vast majority of
indexed capital. . . . Given their voting influence, the concentration of
power in the hands of the Big Three has become a source of concern for
academics and policymakers.”); Bernard S. Sharfman, How the SEC Can
Help Mitigate the “Proactive” Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism, 8 Am.
U. Bus. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2019) (“[T]he largest mutual fund advisers, such as
BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street Global Advisors (‘the Big Three’),
now . . . control an extraordinary amount of shareholder voting power at
many of our largest public companies.”).

63.

See L. Amber Brugnoli, Withholding Democracy: The Timeliness of SelfGovernance in a Post-Conflict Occupation, 15 Loy. U. Chi. Int’l L. Rev.
131, 134 (2018) (“Every modern definition of representative democracy
includes participatory and contested elections perceived as the legitimate
procedure for the translation of rule by the people into workable executive
and legislative power.”); David Prendergast, The Judicial Role in Protecting
Democracy from Populism, 20 German L.J. 245, 247 (2019) (“A basic
etymological description of democracy is the people ruling themselves, or
rule by the people.”); Yasmin Dawood, The Antidomination Model and the
Judicial Oversight of Democracy, 96 Geo. L.J. 1411, 1433 (2008) (“The
term ‘democracy’ has its roots in the Greek words demos (people) and kratos
(rule); at a minimum, democracy means rule by the people.”).

64.

See Jeffrey Glekel, Money in the Public Realm, 94 Yale L.J. 957, 958
(1985) (book review) (“The basic distinction between democracy and
plutocracy is that democracy, although consistent with the unequal
accumulation of wealth in the private realm, does not permit such wealth
to control decisions made in the public realm, the realm of government.”);
Areto A. Imoukhuede, Education Rights and the New Due Process, 47 Ind.
L. Rev. 467, 487 (2014) (“Democracy, given its central concern with
majority consent, provides the greatest respect for individual liberty for the
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Second, allowing index fund managers to function as regulators is
also an affront to democracy because the approach of these entities
appears to focus on a very narrow goal: profit. As explained above,
despite suggestions by index fund managers that they are pursuing
investor diversification and ESG objectives, fund managers argue that
their primary goal is to seek profits for those holding shares in their
index funds.65 As also explained above, this is confusing and misleading
to investors because it suggests that index fund managers are pursuing
a wide range of interests, while they seem to be suggesting that they
are really seeking a narrow one, profit. 66 Consequently, once again,
rather than being democracy, this is really plutocracy because the focus
is on pursuing wealth for the wealthy.67
Third, allowing index fund managers to function as de facto
regulators is also undemocratic because they are subject to inadequate
checks and balances. John Acton famously wrote: “Power tends to
corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost
always bad men . . . .” 68 To combat this unfortunate reality, wellstructed democratic systems contain checks and balances to ensure that
the will of the people is honored.69 One of these checks and balances is
greatest number of individuals. Plutocracy, which literally means ‘rule by
the wealthy,’ does not similarly value the concerns of all the people, but
only those of the wealthy.”); Eric W. Orts & Amy J. Sepinwall, Collective
Goods and the Court: A Theory of Constitutional Commodification, 97
Wash. U. L. Rev. 637, 685–86 (2020) (“Democratic government is a
collective good in the sense that mutual participation of all citizens on at
least a relatively equal basis defines it. To the extent that our government
is or becomes bought and paid for by its wealthiest citizens, it becomes a
plutocracy rather than a collective project of self-government.”).
65.

See supra note 38 and accompanying text (explaining that index fund
managers’ interest in ESG is limited to improving the profitability of the
index funds).

66.

See supra Part II.A (exploring the conflicting interests that index fund
managers are pursuing when they attempt to achieve ESG objectives
through index funds).

67.

See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text (explaining that pursuing
ESG goals through index funds is undemocratic, especially when index fund
manager focus primarily on wealth maximization for investors in their
funds).

68.

Letter from Lord Acton to Bishop Mandell Creighton (Apr. 5, 1887),
reprinted in 1 Louise Creighton, Life and Letters of Mandell
Creighton 372 (1904).

69.

See Catherine E. Kanatas, Lisa G. London & Maxwell C. Smith, Legitimate
from the Inside Out: A Review of How Agencies Act When Judges Are Not
Watching, 17 Rutgers J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 243, 249 (2020) (“The success
of democracy in the United States depends on the health of the components
that make up its structure. Our democracy sits atop a three-legged stool:
the judicial, executive and legislative branches. In order for our democracy
to remain steady, however, those branches must operate under a system of
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typically the ability to vote the person out of office, but they often
include others, such as checks and balances among the various branches
of government. When index fund managers function as regulators, little
to no checks and balances exist to control their behavior and make sure
that the voice of the people is heard and implemented. One response is
that if investors are unhappy with the managers of the funds in which
they invest, then they can sell their shares.70 This is a common practice
and common refrain in instances in which investors are unhappy with
the management of the companies in which they invest directly. In
regard to index funds, however, because the market is dominated by
three players that appear to be behaving similarly regarding ESG,
investors have little choice if they want to invest in this popular
investment vehicle. Consequently, if index fund managers are acting as
de facto regulators, their unchecked power is a concern.
Fourth, allowing index fund managers to act as regulators is also
an affront to democracy because within a democracy individuals and
entities already exist with the expertise, experience, and legitimacy to
function as regulators: actual regulators. Index fund managers typically
have relatively small stewardship teams.71 These teams lack legitimacy
checks and balances, with each leg steadying the other two.”); Tom R.
Tyler, Does the American Public Accept the Rule of Law? The Findings of
Psychological Research on Deference to Authority, 56 DePaul L. Rev.
661, 666 n.24 (2007) (“[C]hecks and balances among the branches of
government are critical to democracy.”).
70.

See Afra Afsharipour, Reevaluating Shareholder Voting Rights in M&A
Transactions, 70 Okla. L. Rev. 127, 142 (2017) (“Shareholder rights are
not limited to voting rights. Shareholders unhappy with corporate decisions
may also sell their shares—in other words, exercise their ‘wall street
vote’ . . . .”); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Corporate Governance and
Bankruptcy, 13 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 99, 103 (2018) (“[M]ost
of the time, shareholders can be counted on to follow the ‘Wall Street
Rule’—if you are unhappy with incumbent managers, then sell your stock
to someone who likes them better . . . .”); D. Theodore Rave, Politicians
as Fiduciaries, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 671, 707 (2013) (“In the corporate
context, if shareholders are unhappy with the behavior of management, they
can simply sell their shares and exit the agency relationship.”).

71.

See Gaia Balp & Giovanni Strampelli, Institutional Investor Collective
Engagements: Non-Activist Cooperation vs Activist Wolf Packs, 14 Ohio
St. Bus. L.J. 135, 156 (2020) (“Although they are expanding, stewardship
teams are still too small even at the leading fund managers. For example,
at Blackrock—the world’s largest asset manager—the stewardship team is
made up of around 40 people, who are tasked with monitoring corporate
governance issues at around 17,000 companies and voting in around 17,000
shareholder meetings each year.”); Caleb N. Griffin, We Three Kings:
Disintermediating Voting at the Index Fund Giants, 79 Md. L. Rev. 954,
965 (2020) (“The investment stewardship teams making voting decisions
are generally quite small in size: Vanguard has about twenty employees who
share responsibility for researching and voting on 168,786 ballot items, or
roughly 8400 per employee. Similarly, BlackRock employs thirty-six people
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because they are not elected. In addition, they focus on a single
underlying goal, increasing returns, and they lack general expertise in
regulating markets, which is in no way their objective. 72 Although
Commissioners and other officials in administrative agencies—such as
the SEC—are not elected, their leaders are nominated by the President
and approved by the Senate.73 The agencies themselves are also created
by acts of Congress.74 As a consequence, their legitimacy is much less
in question than allowing index fund managers to act as regulators. In
addition, for better or worse, administrative agencies, such as the SEC,
are staffed by technocrats who are experts in creating and enforcing
regulation with a general interest in the welfare of the public at large.75

III. Creating a Fund Name Taxonomy
for Investment Funds
In Act II, Scene I of Romeo and Juliet by William Shakespeare,
Juliet Capulet utters the famous words, “What’s in a name? That which
we call a rose [b]y any other name would smell as sweet.”76 While she
is correct that a name does not alter the substance of what is being
described, someone would still be confused and likely unhappy if that
individual ordered roses and tulips arrived, despite the fact that both
flowers have their virtues. The proper and consistent use of words
allows individuals to plan and to more easily navigate the world. To
to analyze and vote on 158,942 proposals, or nearly 4500 issues per
employee. Finally, State Street has twelve people on staff to investigate and
vote on over 154,458 proposals, an average of about 12,900 issues per
employee.”).
72.

See supra note 38 and accompanying text (explaining that index fund
managers have stated that their avowed purpose in pursuing ESG objectives
is to improve returns for investors in their funds).

73.

See 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2018) (“There is hereby established a Securities
and Exchange Commission . . . to be composed of five commissioners to
be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate.”).

74.

See id. (providing for the creation of the SEC).

75.

See Raymond F. Gorman, Martin F. Grace & Gautam Vora, Public Utility
Underwriting Costs and Regulatory Climate: An Examination of PUC and
SEC Multiple Jurisdictions, 10 Yale J. on Reg. 17, 44 n.103 (1993) (“The
SEC’s technical expertise in capital market regulation makes it a more
competent watchdog than Congress, which lacks the means to directly
manage the securities markets.”); Frederick H.C. Mazando, The Taxonomy
of Global Securities: Is the U.S. Definition of a Security Too Broad?, 33
Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 121, 195 (2012) (“As the securities market
regulator, the SEC has intimate knowledge of and unparalleled expertise in
the financial markets . . . .”).

76.

See William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet act 2, sc. 2, l. 46–47.
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put it a bit differently, whether something is referred to as Capulet,
Montague, rose, or tulip does not matter as long as the word is clearly
defined, consistently used, and not misleading.
In regard to the issue addressed in this paper—the incompatibility
of index funds and the advancement of ESG objectives—the solution
lies with making sure that investors are on notice as to the nature of
the funds in which they are investing and how those funds will be
managed. This Essay proposes that the term “index fund” should be
reserved for passively managed funds that are designed to track the
components of financial markets. To facilitate this type of fund to exist,
regulators will need to either create pass-through voting to place voting
into the hands of the investors investing in the fund or remove index
funds from quorum requirements under state law.77 The term “ESG
investment fund” should be reserved for funds that are undertaking
investment decisions based on ESG factors, and the term “ESG
managed fund” should be reserved for funds whose management are
actively seeking to achieve ESG objectives by influencing issuers
through proxy voting and other means. A fund that invests based on
ESG factors and actively seeks to achieve ESG objectives would be
known as an “ESG managed investment fund.” Finally, an ESG fund
that is designed to track a financial market would be known as an “ESG
market fund.” Additional descriptors like “investment,” “managed,” or
both could be added to “ESG market fund” to better explain the nature
of a particular fund.
A. The Case for the Proposed Fund Taxonomy

The proposed fund taxonomy is superior to the current system
because it accords with the policies underlying federal securities law,
allows for investors to make informed investment decisions, and accords
with existing regulation. In regard to the policies underlying federal
securities regulation, the proposed fund taxonomy supports them
because securities law in the United States is disclosure-based

77.

A number of commentators have already suggested that pass-through
voting offers a viable solution to the dominance and the power associated
with it of BlackRock, State Street, and Vanguard in the index fund
industry. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 1, at 2118 (“As an
alternative to taking voting power from index funds, several authors have
suggested taking voting power from the managers of index funds. These
authors advocate ‘pass-through’ requirements that would enable the
beneficial investors of index funds to determine how the votes associated
with the funds’ shares will be cast.”); Griffin, supra note 62, at 440 (“[P]roxy
voting rights [could] ‘pass through’ the index fund intermediary to the
actual investor. Pass-through voting would help to mitigate the problem of
concentrated index fund power by transferring this power from index funds
to their investors”).
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regulation, rather than merit-based regulation.78 In describing federal
securities law in the United States, Justice Arthur Goldberg famously
wrote in the majority opinion for SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc.,79 “[a] fundamental purpose [of federal securities law] was
to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat
emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the
securities industry.” 80 To put it differently, federal securities law is
designed to provide investors with robust, precise, and accurate
information on which to make their investment decisions.81 Increasing
the clarity and consistency of investment fund naming can only help to
achieve this goal.
Relatedly, the proposed taxonomy is also useful because it allows
investors to make informed investment decisions. A segment of the
investors investing in index funds is going to have a sophisticated
understanding that fund managers cannot pursue diversification, ESG
objectives, and seeking profit at the same time.82 While those investors
78.

See Zachary J. Gubler, Reconsidering the Institutional Design of Federal
Securities Regulation, 56 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 409, 417 n.29 (2014) (“The
original draft of the federal securities laws incorporated a form of such ‘merit
review,’ but this proposal was ultimately replaced with a purely disclosurebased regime.”); Mike Koehler, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Ripples, 3
Am. U. Bus. L. Rev. 391, 437 (2014) (“The securities laws are based on
the general premise that issuers must make full and complete disclosure of
all material facts relevant to its business.”); Michael C. Macchiarola, Get
Shorty: Toward Resurrecting the SEC’s Ill-Fated Pursuit of PIPE
Arbitrageurs, 4 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 1, 4 (2009) (“In ushering in this new
federal securities law, Congress embraced a disclosure-based system of
regulation aimed at minimizing the financial risks that an investor faces
when investing on the basis of imperfect or insufficient information.”).

79.

375 U.S. 180 (1963).

80.

Id. at 186.

81.

See Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks
and the Securities Laws—Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must be
Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. Rev. 1735, 1741 (2012)
(“The federal securities laws do not focus on the merits of investments but
rather are based on disclosure to allow sufficiently informed investors to
fend for themselves.”); Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information
Overload and its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 Wash. U.
L.Q. 417, 422 (2003) (“Our federal securities laws are designed to protect
investors and the integrity of capital markets by mandating disclosure that
enables informed investor decision making . . . .”); Urska Velikonja,
Waiving Disqualification: When Do Securities Violators Receive a
Reprieve?, 103 Calif. L. Rev. 1081, 1101 (2015) (“[F]ederal securities laws
are often described as a disclosure-based regime, where the regulator’s
primary goal is not to evaluate the fairness of an offering but to ensure
accurate and complete disclosure to let investors make fully informed
purchasing decisions.”).

82.

See supra Part II.A (examining the unresolvable conflict created by
attempting to achieve portfolio diversification and to pursue ESG objectives
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are investing in inconsistency and incoherence, they are doing so
willingly and with a full understanding of the situation. The problem is
that index funds are marketed to, and the smart choice for,
unsophisticated investors who do not have the knowledge, time, or
resources to actively manage a portfolio of investments. 83 As a
consequence, these investors are reasonable investors in index funds.
Federal securities laws are about the truthful disclosure of material
information to reasonable investors for purposes of making investment
decisions. Materiality is defined as the information that a reasonable
investor would consider in making an investment decision.84 Index funds
are popular because they allow for passive diversification with relatively
low risk and consistent returns. 85 ESG investing is popular in part
because it allows investors to support socially important causes through
their investment activities.86 The fund taxonomy proposed above will
provide material Information to reasonable investors and help all
investors better understand the nature of the funds in which they are
investing in a relatively quick and simple way.
Finally, the fund taxonomy also accords with existing regulation.
In addition to various other general anti-fraud provisions of federal
securities law, section 35(d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940,
which became effective in 2001, provides:
It shall be unlawful for any registered investment company to
adopt as a part of the name or title of such company, or of any
securities of which it is the issuer, any word or words that the
Commission finds are materially deceptive or misleading. The
Commission is authorized, by rule, regulation, or order, to define
such names or titles as are materially deceptive or misleading.87

through proxy voting and other means to influence the management of
portfolio companies).
83.

See supra note 57 and accompanying text (asserting that unsophisticated
investors are reasonable investors in index funds because of the nature of
these investment vehicles).

84.

See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text (providing the definition of
materiality under federal securities law).

85.

See supra notes 21–30 and accompanying text (explaining that index
funds are structured based on Modern Portfolio Theory, which posits that
through diversification, investors can create the greatest likelihood of
consistent returns while minimizing risk).

86.

See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text (discussing the growing
popularity of ESG investing).

87.

15 U.S.C. § 80a-34(d) (2018).
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The SEC has promulgated Rule 35d–1 under this provision to define
materially deceptive and misleading fund names. 88 Whether current
naming practices might violate existing laws and regulations is open for
debate. To provide greater clarity in naming practices, however, Rule
35d–1 could be amended or a new rule could be promulgated to adopt
the taxonomy above. The SEC has generally been interested in the
topic of the naming of index funds. In March 2020, the SEC issued a
request for comments on fund names.89 Specifically, the request posed
various questions relating to the application of existing regulation to
ESG and how regulation ought to evolve.90 This suggests that the SEC
already recognizes the need for action on fund naming and ESG.91 The
fund taxonomy provided above provides a good response to that need.
B. Possible Concerns

The possible concerns with the fund name taxonomy proposed
above are few. The successes of the securities markets in the United
States are a testimony to its high-quality system of securities regulation,
which is founded upon disclosure.92 The taxonomy proposed above is
88.

17 C.F.R. § 270.35d–1 (2020).

89.

Request for Comments on Fund Names, 85 Fed. Reg. 13,221 (Mar. 6,
2020).

90.

Id. at 13,223–24.

91.

Gary Gensler, Chair of the SEC, has spoken publicly about the need for
transparency in the naming of funds focused on ESG, but rather than
proposing an improved taxonomy for naming funds, he has suggested
greater disclosure regarding how and why fund managers use the labels
that they use. See Gary Gensler, Chair, SEC, Remarks before the
European Parliament Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs
(Sept. 1. 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/gensler-remarks-euro
pean-parliament-090121 (“Many funds these days brand themselves as
‘green,’ ‘sustainable,’ ‘low-carbon,’ and so on. I’ve directed staff to review
current practices and consider recommendations about whether fund
managers should disclose the criteria and underlying data they use to
market themselves as such. I also have asked staff to pursue similar
disclosure requirements with respect to human capital and board
diversity.”); Gary Gensler, Chair, SEC, Prepared Remarks Before the
Asset Management Advisory Committee, https://www.sec.gov/news/
public-statement/gensler-amac-2021-07-07 [https://perma.cc/4GH6-FHD
8](“Many funds use terms like ‘green’ or ‘sustainable.’ . . . As there’s not
a standardized meaning of these sustainability-related terms, I’ve asked
staff to consider recommendations about whether fund managers should
disclose the criteria and underlying data they use.”).

92.

See Nathaniel G. Dutt, Current United States Credit Default Swap
Regulatory Initiatives: A New World Standard or Just a Ploy?, 16 ILSA
J. Int’l & Compar. L. 169, 186 (2009) (“[T]he United States is the
leader of the financial markets and the world looks to the United States
for guidance as to regulatory initiatives.”); George W. Madison & Stewart
P. Greene, TIAA-CREF Response to A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access
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founded upon that policy of disclosure as a means of allowing investors
to make an informed choice regarding their investments. With that said,
two major criticisms exist.
First, the proposed fund name taxonomy is relatively basic. This
criticism is legitimate. Obviously, because of the space limitations of
this symposium issue, only a basic sketch can be offered of the type of
nomenclature that ought to be used in regard to investment funds. With
that said, this sketch offers the fundamentals of how a line ought to be
drawn between index funds and ESG activity. The taxonomy proposed
would need to be more fully studied and developed. With that said, the
fundamentals are enough for purpose of this Essay.
Second, the proposed fund name taxonomy may inhibit useful
change. Although the dominance of BlackRock, State Street, and
Vanguard in the index fund industry creates reason for concern because
of the power that they now wield, 93 each of these entities has
demonstrated a commitment to ESG matters.94 Potentially, they may
be able to serve as de facto regulators in a space in which federal and
state governments have failed to act. 95 This could lead to desirable
reforms and force corporations to fulfill their obligations to society.96
Regardless, this still generates the problems that allowing index fund
managers to engage in ESG creates an unresolvable conflict, 97 is

to U.S. Investors: A New International Framework, 48 Harv. Int’l L.J.
99, 100 (2007) (“The SEC performs its task admirably—and sets the
standard against which all other regulators around the globe are judged.
The U.S. market is desirable and one of the most efficient at raising
capital. The SEC, with its track record and high standards for protecting
investors, has historically been a leader in setting benchmarks for market
regulation.”).
93.

See supra notes 5–8 and accompanying text (discussing the power that
BlackRock, State Street, and Vanguard now have as a result of their
dominance in marketing and selling index funds).

94.

See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text (reporting that BlackRock,
State Street, and Vanguard have publicly stated their commitment to
pursuing ESG objectives through their index fund portfolio holdings).

95.

See supra note 61 and accompanying text (explaining that some have
argued that index fund managers can act as de facto regulators in
circumstances in which federal and state governments have failed to take
action on ESG issues).

96.

See generally Eric C. Chaffee, The Origins of Corporate Social
Responsibility, 85 U. Cin. L. Rev. 353 (2017) (discussing the various
circumstances in which the essential nature of the corporate form obligates
corporations to engage in socially responsible behavior).

97.

See supra Part II.A (explaining that pursuing ESG objectives through
index funds creates an unresolvable conflict of interests).
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materially misleading,98 and is undemocratic.99 Although useful reforms
should be made regarding ESG matters, such as a sensible system of
ESG disclosure, these reforms should come from the government, rather
than index fund managers, who are admittedly only seeking to increase
investment returns.100 Additionally, creating an expediency exception
for ESG and index funds while attempting to create fair and
transparent markets seems troubling to say the least. As a consequence,
the proposed fund name taxonomy ought to prevail.

Conclusion
The rise of index funds and ESG investing are two of the most
important developments in investing in recent years. The intersection
of the two, however, has generated a variety of different issues and is
unacceptable because it creates an unresolvable conflict of interests, is
misleading to those purchasing shares in mutual funds, and is
undemocratic. 101 Investors need to be able to quickly and easily
understand the nature of the funds in which they are investing. As a
consequence, the best solution is to adopt the fund name taxonomy
proposed with this Essay.102 Such a taxonomy is superior to the current
system because it accords with the policies underlying federal securities
law, allows for investors to make informed investment decisions, and
accords with existing regulation.103 Reasonable investors in index funds
reflect a much wider segment of the public than reasonable investors in
other circumstances. They deserve to have a clear idea of what they are
purchasing and its attributes.

98.

See supra Part II.B (explaining that pursuing ESG objectives through
index funds is materially misleading).

99.

See supra Part II.C (explaining that pursuing ESG objectives through
index funds is undemocratic).

100. See Taraporevala, supra note 38 (reporting that when index fund
managers pursue ESG objectives through the funds they manage they are
doing so only to pursue profit).
101. See supra Part II (discussing the problems relating to pursing ESG
objectives through index funds via proxy voting and other efforts to
influence management of portfolio companies).
102. See supra Part III (providing a proposal for the creation of a fund name
taxonomy for investment funds).
103. See supra Part III.A (discussing the case for adopting the fund name
taxonomy proposed in this Essay).
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